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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE PERMITS FOR SULFUR OXIDES EMISSIONS 
A Case Study i n  t h e  South Coast A i r  -Basin 
Glen R. Cass, Robert W. Hahn and Roger G. No11 
Since t h e  mid-1970s, pub l i c  policymakers have had inc reas ing  
i n t e r e s t  i n  making g r e a t e r  use of economic i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  t he  purpose 
of improving t h e  cos t- effec t iveness  of environmental regula t ion .  A t  
t h e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l ,  t h e  Environmental P r o t e c t i o n  Agency has  encouraged 
the  development of so- called ' t cont ro l led  t r a d i n g  op t ions ,  " a s e r i e s  
of p o l i c i e s  f o r  in t roducing  more f l e x i b i l i t y  i n t o  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  
r e g u l a t i o n  by al lowing bus inesses  t o  make compensating changes i n  
emissions t h a t  reduce t o t a l  abatement c o s t s  s o  long a s  t h e  environment 
does not  s u f f e r .  Severa l  s t a t e s  have a c t i v e l y  pursued these  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  And, i n  water  p o l l u t i o n ,  one s t a t e  -- Wisconsin - i s  
developing a t r a d a b l e  emissions system i n  some a r e a s  f o r  d ischarges  
i n t o  r i v e r s  and lakes .  
The fundamental idea  of t r a d a b l e  emissions permi ts  i s  a s  
fo l lows.  Regulators  would s e t  ambient a i r  q u a l i t y  s tandards  f o r  a 
reg ion ,  and would use a i r  q u a l i t y  modeling t o  e s t ima te  the  amount of 
areawide emissions t h a t  could be permi t ted  wi thout  exceeding t h e  
s tandard.  Regulators  would i s s u e  permits  f o r  emissions of t h i s  amount 
which would then be a l l o c a t e d  among the  sources of emissions according 
t o  a market process. Assuming t h a t  t h e  market i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
competi t ive,  t h i s  procedure would then n a t u r a l l y  l ead  t o  a f i n a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of emissions t h a t  minimized t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  of abatement 
f o r  t h e  a i r shed .  The reason i s  t h a t  each bus iness ,  i n  a t tempt ing  t o  
minimize i t s  c o s t s  of production,  would view t h e  e n v i r o w e n t ,  through 
the  permi ts  market,  a s  a s ca rce  resource  not  t o  be wasted. 
Noticeably absent  from the  preceding d i scuss ion  i s  t h e  
a c t i v i t y  t h a t  consumes a l a r g e  share  of t he  time of r e g u l a t o r s :  
w r i t i n g  t e c h n i c a l  s tandards f o r  emissions sources.  I n  i t s  pu res t  
form, a permits  market does no t  r e q u i r e  case-by-case r e g u l a t i o n  of 
source ca t egor i e s .  The s p e c i f i c  abatement technologies  and q u a n t i t i e s  
of emissions a t  each source would be s e l e c t e d  by the  bus iness  manager, 
based upon t h e  c o s t s  of abatement and t h e  p r i c e  of m i s s i o n s  permits .  
I n  t h i s  pure  form, r e g u l a t o r s  need only know how many permi ts  a r e  he ld  
by each source. Inspec t ion  and enforcement a c t i v i t i e s  would be s e t  up 
t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  each source emits no more than i s  allowed by i t s  
permits  . 
The advantages of a t r a d a b l e  emissions permits  system a r e  i t s  
s i m p l i c i t y  and i t s  use  of incen t ives  t o  achieve abatement a t  minimum 
cost  t o  soc ie ty .  New sources of emissions can e n t e r  an a i r shed  by 
purchasing emissions permits  from o lde r ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  sources  i n  a 
r egu la r i zed  market, r a t h e r  than by going through a time-consuming 
permit t ing  process.  A l l  sources can avoid the  c o s t s  and u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
of p r o t r a c t e d  regu la to ry  proceedings t h a t  e s t a b l i s h  source- speci f ic  
standards.  Regulators and the  p u b l i c  can be assured of achieving a i r  
q u a l i t y  ob jec t ives ,  a s  long a s  an appropr ia t e  t o t a l  c e i l i n g  on 
emissions i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  and enforced. 
The purpose of t h i s  p r o j e c t  i s  t o  examine the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of a 
system of t r adab le  emissions permits  f o r  dea l ing  wi th  the  problem of 
c o n t r o l l i n g  s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s  i n  t h e  South Coast A i r  Basin. This 
p a r t i c u l a r  problem was s e l e c t e d  t o  provide a focus f o r  what w e  hope i s  
work of more genera l  a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  By working through t h e  problem of 
how one might implement a t r adab le  emissions permits  system f o r  t h i s  
case ,  ques t ions  t h a t  would be r e l e v a n t  i n  any example can be 
a r t i c u l a t e d  and methods developed and demonstrated f o r  answering them. 
S u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s  i n  Los Angeles were s e l e c t e d  because adequate 
da ta  and models of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between emissions and a i r  q u a l i t y  
a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  doing meaningful empir ica l  work on t h e  i s s u e ,  and 
because f o r  va r ious  t e c h n i c a l  reasons  the  problem of s u l f a t e  
p a r t i c u l a t e s  appears e s p e c i a l l y  l i k e l y  t o  be amenable t o  s o l u t i o n  
through the  use of economic incen t ives .  
While s u b s t a n t i a l  work has been done on t h e  genera l  p r o p e r t i e s  
of economic incen t ive  systems, inc luding t r adab le  permits ,  r e l a t i v e l y  
l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  has been paid  t o  t h e  d e t a i l s  of how such systems 
might a c t u a l l y  be implemented. I n  r e a l i t y ,  t h e r e  a r e  seve ra l  s p e c i f i c  
and p o t e n t i a l l y  important i s s u e s  t o  be resolved about e x a c t l y  how t h e  
market w i l l  be s e t  up. The term "market" i s  a gener i c  one t h a t  r e f e r s  
t o  a wide v a r i e t y  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forms. One ques t ion  r e g u l a t o r s  
must f a c e  i s  p r e c i s e l y  what form of market i s  most promising f o r  
t r a d a b l e  permits .  Another ambiguity a r i s e s  i n  t h e  very  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
the  permits  themselves: over what geographic a r e a  can they be t raded,  
how long w i l l  they be e f f e c t i v e ,  and what c o n t r o l s ,  i f  any, w i l l  be 
placed on who can own them -- and on who must own them? S t i l l  another 
ques t ion  i s  how t h e  market w i l l  be i n i t i a l i z e d .  W i l l  t h e  government 
organize t h e  i n i t i a l  s a l e s ,  o r  w i l l  i t  s tand by pass ive ly  and l e t  
i ndus t ry  develop a market by nego t i a t ing  t r a d e s ?  W i l l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  t h e  markets be voluntary  o r  mandatory? And who w i l l  s e l l  t he  
permits  -- t he  e x i s t i n g  p o l l u t e r s  (and i f  so,  how w i l l  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  
holdings be determined), or  t h e  s t a t e ?  
The f e a s i b i l i t y  of t r adab le  emissions permits  depends on a 
number of performance f e a t u r e s  of the  system t h a t  i s  adopted. 
Tradable permits are an a t t r a c t i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  source- speci f ic  
s t anda rds  only  if they reduce the  c o s t s  of r e g u l a t i o n  -- both  
compliance c o s t s  and t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  r egu la to ry  process  -- without  
s a c r i f i c i n g  a i r  q u a l i t y  o b j e c t i v e s .  Thei r  f e a s i b i l i t y  w i l l  a l s o  
depend on t h e  degree  t o  which they a r e  perce ived t o  be a f a i r  and 
e q u i t a b l e  approach t o  the  problem of c o n t r o l l i n g  p o l l u t i o n ,  which i n  
t u r n  depends i n  p a r t  on who b e n e f i t s  and who l o s e s  from t h e  switch t o  
a t r a d a b l e  permi ts  scheme. F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  a ques t ion  of l e g a l  
f e a s i b i l i t y  -- what changes, i f  any, must be made i n  r egu la to ry  law 
be fo re  a t r u e  t r a d a b l e  permi ts  system can be enacted? 
The o b j e c t  of our r e sea rch  was t o  perform the work necessary  
t o  eva lua te  a l t e r n a t i v e  forms of markets  on  the  b a s i s  of t h e i r  
expected performance wi th  r e spec t  t o  these  des ign  ques t ions .  Our aim 
was t o  f i n d  o u t  a s  much a s  we could about  t h e  e f f e c t  on  t h e  
performance of a permits  market of choices  among t h e  d i f f e r e n t  ways a 
market could be organized. Such informat ion  would be u s e f u l  t o  
r egu la to ry  policymakers and t h e  gene ra l  p u b l i c  i n  understanding t h e  
t r a d a b l e  permi ts  approach and s e l e c t i n g  a reasonable  method f o r  
implementing i t .  Current ly ,  r egu la to ry  a t t e n t i o n  i s  focused l a r g e l y  
on problems of implementing EPA's c o n t r o l l e d  t r a d i n g  op t ions ;  however, 
by t ak ing  a more genera l  approach, w e  hope t o  shed l i g h t  on no t  only 
t h e  reform proposals  of immediate concern, bu t  a l s o  on  o t h e r  
approaches t h a t ,  whi le  s i m i l a r  i n  s p i r i t  t o  t h e  cu r ren t  approach, a r e  
i n  some ways q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  This  r e p o r t ,  then,  seeks t o  be a k ind  
of manual concerning t h e  range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  s e t t i n g  up markets  
f o r  emissions permi ts ,  w i th  the  s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e  problem i n  t h e  
South Coast Air  Basin providing t h e  d a t a  f o r  i l l u s t r a t i n g  how one can 
approach t h e  des ign  ques t ions  r a i s e d  above. 
Our approach t o  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of t r a d a b l e  
emissions permi ts  i s  a s  fo l lows.  F i r s t ,  we a t tempted  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  p i t f a l l s  of a market approach t o  r e g u l a t i n g  a i r  p o l l u t i o n .  
Second, we undertook r e s e a r c h  t o  determine whether these  p o t e n t i a l  
p i t f a l l s  a r e  empi r i ca l ly  important  i n  t h e  case of s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s  
i n  Los Angeles. I n  so doing, we i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  methods of a n a l y s i s  
t h a t  would be necessary  t o  perform a s i m i l a r  assessment f o r  o t h e r  
p o l l u t a n t s  and/or o t h e r  r eg ions .  Third,  f o r  the  problems t h a t  appear 
t o  be s e r i o u s  f o r  Los Angeles, we i n v e s t i g a t e  whether they can be 
avoided o r  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  amel iora ted  by t h e  d e t a i l s  of t h e  des ign  of 
t h e  t r a d a b l e  emissions permi ts  system. 
For ease  of expos i t ion ,  we have ca tegor i zed  t h e  problem a r e a s  
t h a t  we f a c e  a s  fo l lows:  (1) t e c h n i c a l  -- r e l a t i n g  t o  i s s u e s  of 
modeling t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of emissions t o  a i r  q u a l i t y  and a c t u a l l y  
achieving a i r  q u a l i t y  t a r g e t s ;  ( 2 )  s t r u c t u r a l  -- r e l a t i n g  t o  problems 
t h a t  might prevent  a market from working smoothly and e f f i c i e n t l y ;  ( 3 )  
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  -- r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  of a n  emissions market on 
i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  and weal th  i n  t h e  r eg ion ;  and (4 )  l e g a l  -- 
r e l a t i n g  t o  the  congruence between l e g i s l a t i v e  and r e g u l a t o r y  law and 
t h e  concept of a t r a d a b l e  emissions permit  system. Each of these  
problem a r e a s  a r e  analyzed s e p a r a t e l y  i n  the  p r o j e c t  r e p o r t  and a r e  
summarized here .  
We be l i eve  t h a t  t h i s  i s  the  most comprehensive study of t h e  
f e a s i b i l i t y  of implementing t r a d a b l e  emissions permits  t h a t  has been 
undertaken t o  date .  Severa l  s t u d i e s  have d e a l t  with the  genera l  case 
f o r  t h e  use of economic incen t ives ,  inc luding t r a d a b l e  permits ,  and 
the problem of designing a t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p e r f e c t  market - t h a t  i s ,  a 
market t h a t  guaranteed maximal economic e f f i c i e n c y .  These provide a 
s o l i d  conceptual  s t a r t i n g  po in t  f o r  the  kind of work repor ted  he re ,  
but  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  problems of designing a system t h a t  works 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  and perf o m s  b e t t e r  than the  cu r ren t  r egu la to ry  system 
a r e  f a r  removed from t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  problems of cha rac te r i z ing  a 
p e r f e c t  system. I n  add i t ion ,  a few s t u d i e s  have d e a l t  w i th  p r a c t i c a l  
problems of a s p e c i f i c  p o l l u t a n t .  These s t u d i e s  do not  have a s  
ex tens ive  empir ica l  informat ion about c o s t s  and a i r  q u a l i t y  models a s  
has been used i n  t h i s  p r o j e c t ,  nor do they examine a range of 
d i f f e r e n t  approaches t o  s e t t i n g  up a market. F i n a l l y ,  we a r e  aware of 
no study t h a t  has p r e t e s t e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  market arrangements by use of 
s imula t ions  and small group experiments . 
Two s t u d i e s  deserving of s p e c i a l  note  a r e  a Rand Corporation 
re sea rch  p r o j e c t  on implementing a market f o r  chlorofluorocarbon 
emissions t o  con t ro l  ozone dep le t ion ,  and a p r o j e c t  a t  t h e  Univers i ty  
of Wisconsin t o  analyze t h e  implementation of a market f o r  BOD 
emissions i n t o  a Wisconsin r i v e r  bas in  system. The former study 
examines c l o s e l y  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  equ i ty  of a permits  approach, a n  
i s s u e  t h a t  i s  o f t e n  overlooked i n  f e a s i b i l i t y  s tud ies .  The l a t t e r  has 
l e d  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  implementation of an  a u c t i o n  f o r  water  p o l l u t i o n  
emissions permits  by t h e  S t a t e  of Wisconsin. While n e i t h e r  study 
c lose ly  l i n k s  market performance t o  environmental outcomes by the  u s e  
of modeling, both a r e  good examples of examining t h e  e f f e c t s  of a 
p a r t i c u l a r  approach t o  t r a d a b l e  emissions -- s e l l i n g  the  permits. 
With t h i s  background, we w i l l  now proceed t o  summarize our 
r e s u l t s .  
THE IN ST ITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
For the  remainder of t h e  1980s, t h e  key po l i cy  i s s u e  i s  not  
whether t r a d a b l e  emissions permits  w i l l  be implemented, but how 
extens ively  they w i l l  be used. EPA's banks, bubbles and o f f s e t s  a r e  
now f i rmly  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  seve ra l  s t a t e s  as a means f o r  in t roducing 
g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  (and hence l m e r  c o s t s )  i n t o  environmental 
r egu la t ion ,  and t h e i r  use  i s  spreading.  
The b a s i c  philosophy of EPA's c o n t r o l l e d  t r a d i n g  o p t i o n s  i s  t o  
overlay the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t r a d e s  onto  t h e  e x i s t i n g  regu la to ry  
s t r u c t u r e .  The s t a r t i n g  po in t  f o r  a l l  sources i s  t h e  s e t  of t echn ica l  
s tandards  t h a t  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  through the  formal r egu la to ry  process.  
Some s tandards  a r e  w r i t t e n  i n  terms of emissions r a t e s ,  but more 
commonly they spec i fy  a technology: low s u l f u r  f u e l ,  scrubbers ,  e t c .  
But i n  a l l  cases ,  source- speci f ic  s tandards  are a permit  t o  emit  a n  
e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  amount of p o l l u t a n t s .  The c o n t r o l l e d  t r ad ing  
op t ions  then  al low r e g u l a t o r s  t o  r e w r i t e  t hese  p m i t s  t o  effecL 
mutually b e n e f i c i a l  t r a d e o f f s  between sources t h a t  a r e  proposed by the  
t r a d e r s  and t h a t  do not  undermine environmental o b j e c t i v e s .  
The pure t r a d a b l e  p e m i t s  system would dispense wi th  source- 
s p e c i f i c  s tandards  a l toge the r .  Regulator s would not  spec i fy  c o n t r o l  
techniques f o r  sources,  even a s  a base l ine  f o r  f u r t h e r  t r ad ing .  
Compliance a c t i v i t i e s  would focus  on checking whether a c t u a l  emissions 
a t  a source were a t  or below permit  holdings.  Of course,  d i spu te s  
over t he  performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of c o n t r o l  technologies  would 
s t i l l  emerge and be the  focus of r egu la to ry  a c t i v i t y ,  but i t  would be 
i n  t h e  context  of enforcement, r a t h e r  than s tandard- set t ing  and 
permi t t ing .  The real-world r egu la to ry  analog i s  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  of 
foods ,  where t h e  focus  of r e g u l a t i o n  i s  the  p u r i t y  of t he  product  and 
the  l e g a l  debate about a firm's production methods t akes  p lace  i n  t h e  
enforcement of t he  p u r i t y  s tandards.  
I n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a permits  market,  some s p e c i f i c  f e a t u r e s  of 
t he  des ign  must be e x p l i c i t l y  decided. One i s  the  d e f i n i t i o n  of a 
permit  i n  dimensions o the r  than  t h e  r a t e  of emissions (usual ly  i n  
pounds per  day) t h a t  i t  allows. Theore t i ca l  p e r f e c t i o n  r e q u i r e s  
s epa ra t e  permits  (and permits  markets )  f o r  every r ecep to r  t h a t  s u f f e r s  
p o l l u t i o n  i n  a reg ion .  A i r  q u a l i t y  i s  not  monitored everywhere, so  
t h i s  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as a need f o r  a sepa ra t e  "permit t o  po l lu t e"  
a t  every monitoring s t a t i o n .  A bus iness  i n  t h e  South Coast A i r  Basin 
would then  have t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  seventeen d i s t i n c t  permi ts  markets. 
P r a c t i c a l l y  speaking, t h i s  i s  no t  a v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  because of i t s  
complexity and c o s t ;  however, it is  worth knowing whether t h e r e  i s  a 
g r e a t  l o s s  of e f f i c i e n c y  and/or  a i r  q u a l i t y  i n  adopting a s impler  
approach. Hence, p a r t  of our  work d e a l s  w i th  the  performance 
d i f f e r e n c e s  between a s i n g l e ,  basin-wide market and seventeen sepa ra t e  
markets. 
A second f e a t u r e  of t he  d e f i n i t i o n  of a permit  i s  i t s  du ra t ion  
- how long i s  it good f o r ,  and how can the  t o t a l  c e i l i n g  on emissions 
be changed? One p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  def ine  a permit as a perpe tua l  
" r igh t  t o  pol lu te ."  The s t a t e  could then  reduce t o a l  emissions 
permi ts  only by something l i k e  a condemnation proceeding: paying 
market va lue  f o r  them i n  e i t h e r  voluntary  o r  mandatory t r ansac t ions .  
Another p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  make t h e i r  du ra t ion  i n d e f i n i t e ,  but sub jec t  
t o  a l t e r a t i o n  through a r egu la to ry  process.  This  i s  t h e  approach 
taken i n  t h e  source- speci f ic  s tandard- set t ing  system, and i n  t h e  
implementation of c o n t r o l l e d  t r a d i n g  opt ions .  A l l  permi ts  a r e  
regarded a s  contingent  on an ambient a i r  q u a l i t y  s tandard.  I f  t h e  
AAQS changes, o r  i f  t he  c u r r e n t  emissions t h a t  r e s u l t  from t h e  
e s t ab l i shed  source- speci f ic  s tandards  do not  succeed i n  achieving  a i r  
q u a l i t y  goa l s ,  source- specif i c  s tandards  can be t ightened ( i m p l i c i t l y  
reducing t h e  amount of emissions permi t ted  a t  each source) .  A t h i r d  
a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  a permit of f i x e d  dura t ion .  I f  permits  p e r i o d i c a l l y  
exp i r e ,  t h e  e x p i r a t i o n  d a t e  becomes a convenient f o c a l  d a t e  f o r  
r e v i s i n g  e i t h e r  t he  t o t a l  emissions c e i l i n g  o r  the  ambient a i r  q u a l i t y  
s tandard ,  and thereby a l t e r i n g  t h e  number of outs tanding  permits .  
This  i s  the  approach being taken i n  the  Wisconsin market f o r  permits  
t o  emit phosphates i n  waterways. These permits  a r e  i s sued  q u a r t e r l y  
through an  auct ion .  The holdings  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  source i n  one 
q u a r t e r l y  per iod have no impl i ca t ions  f o r  t h e  holdings i n  t h e  next  
q u a r t e r ;  each a u c t i o n  i s  a wholly sepa ra te  event .  And, a t  each 
auct ion ,  the  number of permits  can be va r i ed .  
Once the  permits  have been def ined,  a dec i s ion  must be 
made on how t o  d i s t r i b u t e  the  permits  i n i t i a l l y .  One approach i s  
"grandfathering." This  means making e x p l i c i t  t h e  emissions permitted 
according t o  some s e t  of source- specif i c  s tandards ,  and giv ing each 
p o l l u t e r  permits  based upon these  emissions. The b a s i s  f o r  the  
i n i t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  can be p recon t ro l  emissions of a l l  sources ,  the  
emissions from cur ren t  source- speci f ic  s tandards ,  or  emissions from 
some o the r  hypo the t i ca l  s e t  of s tandards .  The amount of permits  need 
not  equal  the  amount of emissions from the  base l ine  s t andards ;  each 
f i rm can be given some f r a c t i o n  of these  emissions a s  t h e i r  base l ine  
permits  holdings.  For example, i n  t h e  South Coast A i r  Basin, g iv ing 
each source permits  equal  t o  somewhat less than h a l f  of cu r ren t  
emissions would br ing the  r eg ion  i n t o  compliance wi th  S t a t e  AAQS f o r  
s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s .  
Another approach t o  i n i t i a l i z a t i o n  i s  t o  a u c t i o n  t h e  permits  
t o  t h e  h ighes t  b idder s ,  a s  i s  the  case i n  Wisconsin. This  impl ies  a 
mandatory requirement t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  permits  markets  i f  a f i r m  
i s  t o  produce any emissions ( o r  emissions above whatever threshhold  
above zero  a r egu la to ry  agency may adopt a s  t h e  r a t e  t r i g g e r i n g  
regu la to ry  concern).  Auctions, of course,  r a i s e  t h e  ques t ion  of what 
t o  do wi th  t h e  revenues c o l l e c t e d  from t h e  s a l e ;  grandfa ther ing does 
no t  r a i s e  such a n  i s s u e  because the  permits  a r e  i n i t i a l l y  g iven away. 
The f i n a l  des ign dec i s ion  has t o  do wi th  t h e  opera t ion  of the  
market a f t e r  the  permits  a r e  i n i t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d .  One a l t e r n a t i v e  
i s  regu la to ry  p a s s i v i t y :  t r a d e s  would occur t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
p o l l u t e r s  found each o t h e r  and nego t i a t ed  a t r ade .  Regula tors  would 
become a source of information about who holds how many permits ,  but 
they would play no r o l e  i n  encouraging t r ades .  This  i s  t h e  normal 
approach r e g u l a t o r s  have taken towards c o n t r o l l e d  t r a d i n g  opt ions .  It 
is  n a t u r a l l y  pai red  wi th  grandfa ther ing a s  a n  i n i t i a l i z a t i o n  pol icy .  
Another a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  f o r  r e g u l a t o r s  t o  organize  the  market. 
I n  t h i s  case,  permits  markets would take  p lace  r e g u l a r l y  according t o  
market r u l e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  agency. Firms could submit r e g u l a r  
r e p o r t s  t o  r e g u l a t o r s  about t h e i r  wi l l ingness  t o  buy o r  s e l l ,  and 
r e g u l a t o r s  could then a c t  a s  brokers  t o  consummate t r a n s a c t i o n s  
(perhaps charging a commission t o  cover t h e i r  c o s t s ) .  O r ,  r e g u l a t o r s  
could schedule pe r iod ic  a u c t i o n s  a t  which a l l  permits  o f f e r e d  f o r  sale 
(wi th  a minimum s a l e s  p r i c e  s t a t e d  by the  s e l l e r )  were s o l d  t o  the  
h ighes t  b idders .  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  these  pe r iod ic  markets could be 
voluntary  o r  mandatory. A mandatory auc t ion  i s  most n a t u r a l l y  
a s soc ia ted  wi th  permits  of f i x e d  d u r a t i o n  t h a t  a r e  i n i t i a l l y  
d i s t r i b u t e d  by a n  auc t ion  a s  we l l .  
The remainder of t h i s  r e p o r t  con ta ins  our a n a l y s i s  of the  
r e l a t i v e  m e r i t s  of these  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  The s e l e c t i o n  among them i s  
not  a pure ly  t h e o r e t i c a l  ques t ion ,  f o r  a s  we w i l l  e x p l a i n  t h e  system 
t h a t  i s  more promising f o r  any g iven p o l l u t i o n  problem depends on t h e  
t echn ica l  d e t a i l s  of the  problem and t h e  l e g a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
environment i n  which it must opera te .  
Before proceeding wi th  our r e s u l t s ,  a  few important caveats  
a r e  i n  order .  We have not  sys t ema t i ca l ly  d e a l t  w i th  t h e  i s s u e  of a i r  
p o l l u t i o n  "episodes" -- e.g. per iods  i n  which atmopheric cond i t ions  
a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  r i p e  f o r  severe  a i r  po l lu t ion .  We a r e  assuming t h a t  
these  w i l l  continue t o  be d e a l t  wi th  a s  emergencies r equ i r ing  s p e c i f i c  
r egu la to ry  i n t e r v e n t i o n s ,  al though i n  p r i n c i p l e  they,  t oo ,  a r e  
a t t r a c t i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  a  market. We have a l s o  not  d e a l t  
sys t ema t i ca l ly  w i t h  i n t e r a c t i o n s  among p o l l u t a n t s  and c o n t r o l  
technologies.  Some c o n t r o l  methods reduce s e v e r a l  kinds of emissions,  
and so  t h e i r  economic a t t r a c t i o n  t o  a n  i n d u s t r y  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
o v e r a l l  s t r u c t u r e  of r egu la t ion ,  not  j u s t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  one 
p o l l u t a n t ,  s u l f u r  oxides.  Moreover, s u l f u r  oxides  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  f o u r  
d i s t i n c t  environmental problems: SO2 (usua l ly  a  l o c a l i z e d  problem 
near  a s p e c i f i c  source) ,  s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s ,  t o t a l  suspended 
p a r t i c u l a t e s  (TsP), and a c i d  r a i n .  We assume t h a t  source- speci f ic  
s tandards  (such a s  minimum s t a c k  h e i g h t )  w i l l  cont inue  t o  be app l i ed  
t o  c o n t r o l  SOZ, and t h a t  TSP and a c i d  r a i n  cons ide ra t ions  w i l l  no t  
cause f u r t h e r  changes i n  s u l f a t e  r e g u l a t i o n  i f  t h e  S t a t e  AAQS f o r  
s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s  i s  achieved. Thus, we a r e  t r e a t i n g  s u l f a t e  
p a r t i c u l a t e s  a s  a n  independent po l lu t an t .  
With these  caveats  i n  mind, we proceed t o  our a n a l y s i s  of 
market a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Some of the  p o t e n t i a l  problems of a n  emissions 
permit  market a r e  analyzed i n  terms of t h e i r  immediate e f f e c t s  on 
abatement c o s t s ,  t he  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of emissions,  and a i r  q u a l i t y .  I n  
order  t o  undertake these  analyses ,  two types  of informat ion  were 
needed: t h e  c o s t s  of a l l  of t h e  important  abatement methods a v a i l a b l e  
t o  sources  i n  t h e  a i r  shed, and a model of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
emissions and a i r  q u a l i t y .  The next  s e c t i o n  reviews the  c o l l e c t i o n  
and use  of these  data.  
TECHNICAL ASPECTS 
The problem of s u l f u r  oxides abatement i n  t h e  South Coast Air  
Basin was chosen a s  the  p r a c t i c a l  focus  f o r  t h i s  s tudy of t r a n s f e r a b l e  
permits  t o  emit a i r  p o l l u t a n t s  because it  i s  an  a t t r a c t i v e  candidate  
f o r  ana lys i s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  S t a t e  of Cal i fornia ' s  a i r  q u a l i t y  o b j e c t i v e s  
f o r  p a r t i c u l a t e  s u l f a t e s  have y e t  t o  be a t t a i n e d  i n  t h e  Los Angeles 
area .  Thus, improvements i n  t h i s  problem a r e  a  ma t t e r  of cu r ren t  
p u b l i c  po l i cy  i n t e r e s t .  Second, t h e  e f f e c t  of emission sources  on  
observed s u l f a t e  a i r  q u a l i t y  can be modeled mathematical ly i n  a  way 
t h a t  provides an  accura te  means f o r  t e s t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  of a l t e r e d  
emission c o n t r o l s  on f u t u r e  a i r  q u a l i t y .  The number of source 
ca t egor i e s  of emissions involved i n  t h i s  problem i s  sma l l  enough t o  
make the  problem t r a c t a b l e  but numerous enough t o  hold promise of 
support ing a compet i t ive  market f o r  l i c e n s e s  t o  emit a i r  p o l l u t a n t s .  
F i n a l l y ,  c o n t r o l  measures a r e  t e c h n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  t h a t  would be 
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  l i m i t  SO emissions t o  a l e v e l  cons i s t en t  with a t t a i n i n g  
S t a t e  a i r  q u a l i t y  o b j e s t i v e s .  Thus, the  p r i n c i p a l  ques t ion  i s  t o  
i d e n t i f y  t h e  bes t  con t ro l  a l t e r n a t i v e  -- which i s  exac t ly  t h e  problem 
t h a t  a  f r e e  market i n  emission permits  i s  designed t o  so lve  -- and t o  
decide whether t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  imposes acceptable  cos t s .  
A t e c h n i c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  Los Angeles s u l f u r  ox ides  a i r  
q u a l i t y  problem i s  provided by Cass, and i s  descr ibed i n  Chapter 2 of 
our r e p o r t .  As a r e s u l t  of t h a t  s tudy,  a  mathematical model was 
formulated and t e s t e d  t h a t  r e l a t e s  s u l f u r  oxides emissions t o  observed 
s u l f a t e  a i r  q u a l i t y .  Su l fu r  oxides  emissions t o  t h e  Los Angeles a rea  
atmosphere were surveyed w i t h i n  more than t h i r t y  c l a s s e s  of mobile and 
s t a t i o n a r y  source types.  These emission sources  were loca ted  
s p a t i a l l y  wi th in  t h e  g r i d  system shown i n  Figure  1. Large off- gr id  
power p l a n t s  and o t h e r  major source types  w i t h i n  the  e n t i r e  domain of 
Figure  1 a l s o  were included i n  the  a i r  q u a l i t y  model c a l c u l a t i o n s .  
The a i r  q u a l i t y  model then was used t u  compute the  s u l f a t e  and t o t a l  
s u l f u r  oxides concentra t ions  t h a t  would p r e v a i l  i n  t h e  presence of 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  observed emissions p a t t e r n s  ( see  F igure  2). Model 
r e s u l t s  were t e s t e d  a g a i n s t  observed s u l f a t e  concentra t ions  i n  oder t o  
confirm the  accuracy of a i r  q u a l i t y  model p red ic t ions ,  a s  shown i n  
Figure  3. The v a l i d a t e d  emissions t o  a i r  q u a l i t y  model can then  be 
used t o  study the  e f f e c t  on s u l f a t e  a i r  q u a l i t y  of a l t e r i n g  t h e  
magnitude and s p a t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of SOx emissions t h a t  would occur 
i n  response t o  a system of t r a n s f e r a b l e  emission permits .  
The a i r  q u a l i t y  model developed by Cass was used t o  t e s t  t h e  
e f f e c t  of emission source r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  on observed s u l f a t e  a i r  
q u a l i t y .  One key ques t ion  t o  be addressed i s  whether t h e  SOx 
emissions p a t t e r n  t h a t  r e s u l t s  from a t r a n s f e r a b l e  permits  system w i l l  
l ead  t o  anomalous hot  spo t s  wi th  h igh s u l f a t e  l e v e l s ,  o r  continue t o  
produce a f a i r l y  uniform s p a t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of a i r  q u a l i t y  a s  has 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  been t h e  case ( s e e  Figure  2 ) .  I n  s h o r t ,  can permits  be 
t raded widely between sources  on the  b a s i s  of t o n s  per  day of s u l f u r  
oxides emissions without c r e a t i n g  se r ious  a i r  q u a l i t y  d i s t o r t i o n s ?  A 
r e l a t e d  ques t ion  i s  t h e  magnitude of the  c a l c u l a t i o n  e r r o r  i f  r o l l b a c k  
c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  used t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  e f f e c t  of a l t e r e d  emissions on 
s u l f a t e  a i r  q u a l i t y .  
I n  order  t o  exp lo re  f u t u r e  a i r  q u a l i t y  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y ,  a 
p r o j e c t i o n  of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s u l f u r  oxides  emissions i n  t h e  Los 
Angeles a r e a  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1980s was assembled. Future  SO emissions 
a r e  h ighly  dependent on n a t u r a l  gas  supply c o n s t r a i n t s .  31 base case 
was chosen i n  which t h e  e f f e c t s  of e i t h e r  a high o r  low l e v e l  of 
n a t u r a l  gas  supply could be examined. The emission p r o j e c t i o n  was 
suppl ied  t o  t h e  a i r  q u a l i t y  model, and a base case l e v e l  of s u l f a t e  
a i r  q u a l i t y  was computed. A s  seen by comparing Figure  2 and Figure  4, 
i t  was determined t h a t  even a t o t a l  s h i f t  of f u e l  burning sources  t o  
o i l  would not  r e s u l t  i n  much p e r t u r b a t i o n  of s u l f a t e  concentra t ion  
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p a t t e r n s  from those observed i n  che mid-1970s when gas  was more 
a v a i l a b l e  than i s  assumed i n  t h e  s imula t ion  f o r  t h e  e a r l y  1980s. 
The a i r  q u a l i t y  model i s  capable of d i s t i ngu i sh ing  the  e f f e c t  
of each emission source type on a i r  q u a l i t y  a t  each monitoring s i t e  
(F igure  5).  Consequently, t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of emissions t h a t  r e s u l t s  
from any given c e i l i n g  on t o t a l  emissions t h a t  i s  then  a l l o c a t e d  
through a market ( o r  any o the r  procedure)  can be evalua ted  i n  terms of 
i t s  e f f e c t s  on a i r  q u a l i t y .  
I n  o rde r  t o  c a l c u l a t e  what t h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of emissions 
would be, a model p red ic t ing  the  behavior  of f i rms  i n  a permits  market 
is  requi red .  I f  a competi t ive market f o r  permits  can be e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
i t  w i l l  have the  proper ty  t h a t  f o r  t he  e n t i r e  a i r  shed the  t o t a l  c o s t s  
of aba t ing  s u l f u r  emissions w i l l  be minimized f o r  any g iven  t o t a l  
c e i l i n g  on emissions. Hence, t he  problem of d e t e c t i n g  the  p a t t e r n  of  
emissions i n  a well- functioning market i s  t h e  same as t h e  problem of 
f i nd ing  the  minimum-cost method of achieving  any g iven  emissions 
t a r g e t  . 
To f i n d  minimum cos t  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  abatement problem r e q u i r e s  
f i n d i n g  the  c o s t s  of a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t  abatement a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  a l l  source ca t egor i e s .  Research was undertaken by surveying t h e  
published l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h e  r eco rds  i n  r egu la to ry  proceedings, and t h e  
important  sources of s u l f u r  oxides emissions i n  t h e  a i r  shed d i r e c t l y  
through personal  in terv iews as t o  t h e  range of abatement p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
a v a i l a b l e .  From t h i s  information,  an abatement cos t  func t ion  -- e.g. a 
mathematical r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  amount of emissions aba ted  and t h e  
t o t a l  cos t  of abatement -- was cons t ruc ted  f o r  each source. The 
minimum-cost s o l u t i o n  t o  the  problem of achieving  any emissions t a r g e t  can 
then  be ca l cu la t ed ,  inc luding  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of emissions among sources.  
These emissions were then  en te red  i n t o  the  a i r  q u a l i t y  model t o  f o r e c a s t  
t he  r e s u l t s  i n  terms of t h e  geographic p a t t e r n  of concen t r a t ions  of 
s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s .  
Once these  two models -- abatement c o s t s  and a i r  q u a l i t y  -- 
a r e  i n  p lace ,  they can be used t o  examine the  e f f e c t s  of a v a r i e t y  of  
d i f f e r e n t  condi t ions .  Abatement c o s t s  obviously depend on t h e  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of n a t u r a l  gas,  a f u e l  w i th  e s s e n t i a l l y  no s u l f u r  content  
and s o  a n  extremely cos t- e f fec t ive  approach t o  abatement. The 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of n a t u r a l  gas  a l s o  a f f e c t s  t he  emissions t h a t  w i l l  
r e s u l t  from t h e  e x i s t i n g  s e t  of s tandards .  To o b t a i n  informat ion  on 
t h e  range of condi t ions  under which a market ,  o r  any o the r  system of 
r egu la t ion ,  might be c a l l e d  upon t o  opera te ,  markets and a i r  q u a l i t y  
r e s u l t s  were s imulated f o r  a range of emissions t a r g e t s  and s t a t e s  of  
n a t u r a l  gas  a v a i l a b i l i t y .  For n a t u r a l  gas ,  t h r e e  cases  were s tudied:  
low a v a i l a b i l i t y  and a l l o c a t i o n  p r i o r i t i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by r e g u l a t i o n s  
t h a t  were expected, but d i d  not  m a t e r i a l i z e ,  i n  t h e  l a t e  1970s; 
h i s t o r i c a l  a v a i l a b i l i t i e s  and a l l o c a t i o n s  i n  1973, when n a t u r a l  gas  
was i n  somewhat t i g h t  supply because of p r i c e  r e g u l a t i o n  but not  a s  
r e s t r i c t e d  a s  was then being f o r e c a s t ;  and high gas  a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  i n  
which gas  i s  s t i l l  not  f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e  a t  market p r i c e s ,  but  i s  
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nea r ly  so. The case of high a v a i l a b i l i t y  seems t o  be developing now 
due t o  t h e  p a r t i a l  de regu la t ion  of p r i c e s  and t h e  ensuing "gas 
bubble." Each of t hese  supply assumptions was then combined wi th  a 
s e r i e s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  t o t a l  c e i l i n g s  on emissions,  ranging from t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  would r e s u l t  i f  cu r r en t  s tandards  were i n  f o r c e  but 
n a t u r a l  gas  supp l i e s  were severe ly  c u r t a i l e d ,  down t o  t h e  150 tons  pe r  
day of so2-equivalent  emissions t h a t ,  according t o  ro l lback  models, 
would s a t l s f y  the  S t a t e  AAQS f o r  s u l f a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e s .  The important 
benchmark emissions t a r g e t s  a r e  shown i n  Table 1. 
The major t echn ica l  ques t ion  i s  whether competi t ive permits  
markets  would c r e a t e  l o c a l  hot  s p o t s  i n  a i r  po l lu t ion .  To t e s t  t h i s  
propos i t ion ,  t he  minimum cos t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of permi ts  was c a l c u l a t e d  
f o r  a simple permi ts  market,  i n  which permits  can be t raded  f r e e l y  
throughout t h e  a i r shed ,  and f o r  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  supe r io r  system i n  
which sepa ra t e  permi ts  must be t raded  f o r  every r ecep to r  poin t .  
Table 2 p re sen t s  some of t h e  r e s u l t s  of t hese  s imulat ions.  
The case  analyzed he re  i s  one i n  which n a t u r a l  gas  a v a i l a b i l i t y  i s  
low. This  case i s  l i k e l y  t o  produce t h e  g r e a t e s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
abatement c o s t s  among va r ious  methods f o r  organizing the  permi ts  
market. I f  gas  supp l i e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  in termedia te  q u a n t i t i e s ,  
abatement c o s t s  tend  t o  be  about  60 percent  of t h e  c o s t s  i f  n a t u r a l  
gas  supp l i e s  are low. Column A shows t h e  annualized expendi tures  on 
abatement c o s t s  i n  t h e  Los Angeles a r ea  under t he  competi t ive 
equi l ibr ium d i s t r i b u t i o n  of permi ts  i f  t h e r e  i s  no geographical  f i ne-  
tuning  of t he  permit system. Column B shows the  c o s t s  i f  f i rms  a r e  
r equ i r ed  t o  buy p o l l u t i o n  permi ts  f o r  each of t h e  seventeen measuring 
s t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  a i r shed ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t he  condi t ions  t h a t  t h e  a i r  
q u a l i t y  r e s u l t s  a t  each s t a t i o n  w i l l  be the  same a s  t h e  outcome from 
the  system repor t ed  i n  Column A. Thus, t he  d i f f e rence  between A and B 
i s  t h e  ga in ,  i f  any, a r i s i n g  s o l e l y  from geographical  r e l o c a t i o n  of 
permi ts  i n  a system t h a t  t akes  account of t he  s p e c i f i c  p o l l u t i n g  
e f f e c t s  of emissions from each l o c a t i o n  i n  t h e  region .  Column C 
f u r t h e r  r e l a x e s  the  system, al lowing p o l l u t i o n  a t  a l l  measuring 
s t a t i o n s  t o  be cons t ra ined  only  by the  a i r  q u a l i t y  achieved a t  t h e  
most po l lu t ed  s t a t i o n  under t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  corresponding t o  Column A. 
Thus, emissions can be r e a l l o c a t e d  and t o t a l  emissions increased  a s  
long a s  p o l l u t i o n  does not  i nc rease  beyond t h a t  found a t  t he  l o c a t i o n  
t h a t  i s  most po l lu t ed  under t h e  Column A a l l o c a t i o n .  
The gene ra l  r e s u l t  from the  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
t o  be gained from fine- tuning t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of permits .  The reasons  
a r e  twofold: t he  simple market a l l o c a t e s  emissions r e l a t i v e l y  evenly 
over t h e  reg ion ,  and leaves  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  d i f f e r e n c e s  among 
measuring s t a t i o n s  i n  terms of t h e  a i r  q u a l i t y  r e s u l t s .  Hence, t h e r e  
is l i t t l e  oppor tuni ty  i n  terms of e i t h e r  lower c o s t s  o r  b e t t e r  a i r  
q u a l i t y  f o r  improving the  e f f i c i e n c y  of t he  a l l o c a t i o n  through 
adopting a more complicated market system. 
TABLE 1 
SELECTED AIR QUALITY TARGETS FOR THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN 
i n  tons sox/daya 
TARGET 
ALLOWABLE 
EMISSIONS 
1. Achieve California Su l fa te  A i r  Quality Standard 149 
of 25 micrograns/cubic meter w e r  a 2 4  hour 
averaging time. 
2. Violate California Sulfate  A i r  Quality Standard 23 8 
3-5% of the time. 
3 .  No addit ional  controls  with an above average 33 5 
natural gas supply. 
4. No add i t i ona l  controls  w i th  a law natural gas 42 1 
s UPP l y  
TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF UNIVERSAL AND RECEPTOR-SPECIFIC PERMITS 
(costs in millions of 1977 $ ) 
I Annualized Costs of Competitive Eauilibrium Abatement for: 
Bas el ine 1 
Emissions I Receptor-Specific Permits that Produce: 
Target in 1 A. I B. I C. 
~ons/Day I Universal 1 Same Air Quality 1 Uniform Air Quality 
SO Equivalent I Pernits I For Each Receptor 1 Equal to Worst Receptor 2 
MARKET STRUCTURE PROBLEMS 
One issue t o  be attacked i s  the  pos s ib i l i t y  t ha t  the  market 
w i l l  not achieve the competitive idea l .  The f i r s t  s t ep  i n  addressing 
t h i s  issue i s  t o  simulate the  competitive, minimum-cost a l l oca t i on  of 
permits, and then see i f  the r e s u l t  shows an especial ly  high degree of 
concentration of holdings. Numerous market simulations have been made 
under varying assumptions about ambient a i r  qua l i ty  standards and the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of subs t i t u t e s  fo r  petroleum fue l s ,  and a r e  reported i n  
the  main report .  Three examples w i l l  be presented here. One assumes 
t h a t  the  s ta te ' s  ambient a i r  qua l i ty  standards w i l l  be s a t i s f i e d  a l l  
of the time; the second assumes t ha t  the standards w i l l  be v io la ted  
approximately two weeks per year;  and the  t h i r d  assumes t h a t  the  
emissions allowed under regulat ions  now i n  place become f r ee ly  
tradable.  A l l  cases assume an intermediate a v a i l a b i l i t y  of na tura l  
gas. Under t h i s  assumption, the controls  on su l fu r  oxides emissions 
t h a t  were es tabl ished i n  1977 would produce emissions of about 300 
tons of SO2 equivalent per day i n  Los Angeles; t o  meet the standard 
a l l  of the  time requires  t h a t  emissions be cut i n  h a l f ,  but t o  meet it 
a l l  but two weeks per year,  on average, requ i res  a reduction of only 
about 50 tons per day. Thus, the  th ree  cases represent  a major 
change, a minor reduction, and no change i n  current ly  enacted (but not 
ye t  f u l l y  i n  place)  source- specific standards. 
The s ing le  l a rges t  source of emissions i s  an e l e c t r i c  u t i l i t y .  
I n  1973, p r io r  t o  controls ,  t h i s  source accounted fo r  approximately 28 
percent of emissions i n  Los Angeles. Table 3 shows the share of 
permits t h a t  t h i s  f i rm would be expected t o  hold under two simulated 
market s t ruc tures  f o r  the cases described above. 
The shares reported i n  Table 3 should not be taken too 
l i t e r a l l y .  Among the major source categories  i n  Los Angeles, 
abatement costs  a r e  best  known -- and l e a s t  l i ke ly  t o  be overestimated 
-- f o r  e l e c t r i c  u t i l i t i e s .  This means tha t  even grea te r  eff ic iency 
gains  may be possible  by subs t i tu t ing  abatement elsewhere for  the  
emissions reductions a t  u t i l i t i e s  t ha t  a r e  calculated from the 
ex is t ing  cost  data. 
With t h i s  caveat i n  mind, the  r e s u l t s  i n  Table 3 i l l u s t r a t e  
the pos s ib i l i t y  of ser ious  market imperfections, depending upon the 
se lec t ion  of an emissions t a r g e t  and an i n i t i a l  a l l oca t i on  of the  
permits. Column A shows the costminimizing a l loca t ion  of permits 
under the th ree  emissions t a rge t s  described above. This a l l oca t i on  i s  
the competitive (costminimizing)  equilibrium. I f  the  i n i t i a l  
a l l oca t i on  process i s  an auct ion so t h a t  a l l  f irms a r e  buyers, the  
share of the  la rges t  source i s  the share shown i n  Column A. Other 
i n i t i a l  a l loca t ions  can r a i s e  t h i s  f i gu re  subs tan t ia l ly .  For example, 
suppose a l l  sources a r e  a l located a proportion of t h e i r  precontrol 
emissions t h a t  i s  calculated t o  r e t a i n  present t o t a l  emissions. I n  
t h i s  case, the  l a rges t  source, assuming the market were competitive, 
would seek t o  increase i t s  share  of holdings by 20 percent of the  
t o t a l  number of permits ( the  dif ference between 48 percent on Line 1 
TABLE 3 
FRACTION OF TOTAL EHISSIONS ACCOUNTED FOR 
BY LARGEST PERMIT HOLDER I N  LOS ANGELES 
A. 
Competition 
(percent 
1. Make ex i s t ing  permits tradable 
w i t h  h i s tor ica l  gas supplies 4 8 
2.  Violate standard two weeksfyear 
with his tor ica l  gas supplies 43 
3 .  Sat i s fy  standard a l l  of the time 
with h i s tor ica l  gas supplies 32 
B. 
Monopsonv 
(percent 
3 3 
40 
32 
Column A and the 28 percent share of precontrol emissions). This 
would make t h i s  source an almost complete monopsonist, e.g. the only 
source of demand f o r  permits a t  the competitive equilibrium pr ice  
(almost a l l  o ther  firms would be s e l l e r s ) .  The po ten t ia l  ineff ic iency 
of a monopsonist i s  t ha t  i t  w i l l  systematically understate i t s  demand 
i n  order t o  force down the pr ice  of permits. This i s  achieved by 
engaging i n  excessive abatement, the ex t r a  cos t s  of which a r e  made up 
i n  the  savings t o  the  monopsonist of pushing down permit pr ices .  
Column B shows the r e s u l t s  from the most extreme degree of 
monopsony t h a t  i s  possible  fo r  each of the  three cases. Here it i s  
assumed tha t  the  l a rges t  source has an i n i t i a l  a l loca t ion  of no 
permits, and t h a t  a l l  o ther  firms a r e  given permits i n  a manner t h a t  
causes them t o  seek t o  be s e l l e r s  a t  any pr ice  equal t o  or  above the 
monopsony equilibrium. The pa t te rn  of the  r e s u l t s  shows a g r ea t e r  
divergence between competitive and monopsony shares f o r  higher t o t a l  
l im i t s  on emissions. The reason i s  t h a t  i n  the  range of the  
competitive equilibrium f o r  emissions l im i t s  around the most s t r ingent  
standard, the  supply of permits from other firms t o  the  la rges t  source 
i s  very s ens i t i ve  t o  p r ice  changes. This undermines the opportunity 
of the  monopsonist t o  take advantage of i t s  high market share: 
overabatement w i l l  not fo rce  much of a drop i n  permit pr ices ,  and 
hence the  gains from the l a t t e r  w i l l  not generate much of an o f f s e t  
against  the  higher abatement cos t s  t h a t  a r e  necessary t o  allow the 
firm t o  reduce i t s  demand fo r  permits. 
The t en t a t i ve  conclusion from t h i s  ana lys i s  i s  t h a t  f o r  the  
pa r t i cu l a r  case a t  hand, monopsony appears t o  be a ser ious  design 
concern only i f  regulators  do not conform t o  the ex is t ing  ambient a i r  
qua l i t y  standards. The ac tua l  a l l oca t i on  r u l e  i s  c e r t a in  t o  be l e s s  
l i ke ly  t o  cause monopsony than the extreme case analyzed here;  ye t ,  
even under t h i s  extreme assumption, imperfections i n  t he  permit market 
appear r e l a t i ve ly  unimportant i f  the emissions l i m i t  i s  low. Market 
imperfections could be important i f  ex i s t ing  permits were simply made 
tradable unless the  i n i t i a l  a l l oca t i on  were designed t o  guard aga ins t  
it. An auct ion process, however, would put firms on the  same 
(demand) s ide of the  market, and would theref ore have l e s s  chance of 
leading t o  monopolistic behavior. 
Another major po t en t i a l  source of f a i l u r e  i n  the  permits 
market i s  t ha t  t ransact ions  w i l l  be too infrequent t o  convey 
meaningful p r ice  s igna ls  t o  pol lut ing firms, t o  make r e l a t i ve ly  easy 
the acquis i t ion  of permits f o r  entry  and expansion of pol lut ing 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  and t o  allow a f i rm t o  avoid the  expense of organizing t h e  
market and engaging i n  extensive b i l a t e r a l  negot ia t ion every time i t  
des i res  t o  make a trade.  This i s  an especial ly  d i f f i c u l t  design 
problem t o  ge t  a f i rm g r i p  on i n  advance of operating the market, f o r  
the  ind ica tors  of the extent of market t ransac t ions  a r e  so crude. One 
measure i s  the number of f i rms accounting f o r  ex i s t ing  and expected 
emissions. In  Los Angeles t en  companies account f o r  approximately 85 
percent of the su l fu r  oxides emissions under current  standards,  
assuming mobile sources a r e  assigned t o  the  o i l  r e f i ne r s  operating i n  
the  airshed. Most major i ndus t r i a l  po l lu te rs  emit r e l a t i ve ly  small 
amounts of su l fur  oxides so t h a t  the  market f o r  small quan t i t i e s  of 
permits i s  l i ke ly  t o  be reasonably well- functioning; however, a major 
expansion or  entry  of an o i l  re f inery ,  an offshore  o i l  terminal,  or  an 
e l e c t r i c  u t i l i t y  generation f a c i l i t y  would be espec ia l ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
accommodate because so few sources have su f f i c i en t  numbers of permits 
t o  be po ten t ia l ly  s ign i f ican t  s e l l e r s  t o  the new source. 
A second problem i n  an t ic ipa t ing  t he  extent of a problem of 
market thinness i s  t ha t  there  i s  l i ke ly  t o  be a systematic tendency t o  
underestimate the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t ransact ions .  A subs tan t ia l  
source of demand and supply i n  the  market f o r  permits w i l l  be f ac to r s  
t h a t  a r e  not measurable i n  advance. Examples a r e  innovatians i n  
abatement technology, entry ,  e x i t ,  contract ion and expansion of 
pol lut ing e n t i t i e s ,  and opportuni t ies  fo r  more e f f i c i e n t  abatement 
methods t h a t  may be known t o  ex is t ing  sources but t h a t  have not  yet 
appeared i n  t he  public domain (e.g. process changes). 
I n  Los Angeles, the problem i s  even more d i f f i c u l t  because the 
loca l  a i r  po l lu t ion  control  au thor i ty  has e x p l i c i t l y  adopted t he  
policy or attempting t o  wr i te  standards i n  inverse order of t h e i r  
costs  per u n i t  of abatement. Thus, with few exceptions, the standards 
i n  place a re  the  l e a s t  expensive p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  Of course, regulators  
a r e  not prescient ,  and have missed some p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  cost- 
minimization, but the overa l l  performance i n  Los Angeles i s  qu i t e  
good. Consequently, most of the  demand fo r  t rades ,  and the  gains  from 
a permits market, a re  unlikely t o  be measured using ex is t ing  cost  
information because present standards tend t o  be based upon s imi la r  
cost  data ,  Therefore, our approach t o  estimating the extent t o  which 
the  thinness of the  market i s  a po ten t ia l  problem i s  l i ke ly  t o  be 
unduly pessimistic.  
I n  any case, whether the  market i s  t h in ,  i n i t i a l l y  and i n  the  
fu ture ,  depends i n  par t  on the design of the system. A few examples 
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  point.  (1 )  I f  ex i s t ing  emissions (or  some proportion 
of them) a re  simply made tradable,  a t h in  market i s  more l i ke ly  than 
i f  an auct ion process i s  used for t h e  i n i t ? a l  a l l oca t i on  because the 
l a t t e r  induces more firms t o  par t i c ipa te .  ( 2 )  Fine-tuned, multiple- 
market systems a r e  more l i ke ly  t o  face a problem of thinness than 
s ing le  markets defined over a broad geographic area  because not a l l  
f irms need pa r t i c ipa t e  i n  a l l  markets. (3)  I f  permits a r e  perpetual 
with no per iodic  rea l loca t ion  process, a decis ion t o  make a major 
purchase or s a l e  would then requi re  t h a t  the  firm wishing t o  make a 
market undertake the time and expense of organizing and negotiating a 
trade.  A t  the  other extreme, i f  permits have a f ixed l i f e  and a r e  
real located by auction, a convenient time and place i s  es tabl ished f o r  
f a c i l i t a t i n g  major r ed i s t r i bu t i ons  of permits should changes i n  
underlying economic and technological conditions warrant it. 
DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES 
The p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  of a system of t radable  emissions 
permits depends i n  par t  on the perceptions members of society  have on 
t h e i r  f a i rne s s  and equity.  Two i ssues  s t r i k e  us a s  important i n  t h i s  
regard: the  e f f e c t s  of a permits market on the i ndus t r i a l  s t ruc ture  
of a region, and the  e f f ec t s  of a permits market on the d i s t r i bu t i on  
of wealth. The t h i r d  equity issue normally associated with emissions 
permits -- t ha t  they a r e  inherently an immoral or inequi table  idea for  
pol lut ion because they convey a r i gh t  t o  po l lu te  -- i s  i n  some ways 
beyond the  scope of t h i s  p ro jec t ,  although i n  a technical  sense the  
argument i s  not s t r i c t l y  correct .  Tradable emissions permits imply no 
necessary re laxa t ion  i n  the  con t ro l l ab i l i t y  of po l lu t ion  or  the  
a s se r t i on  of society's r i gh t  t o  regula te  it ,  although they could 
(mistakenly) be so designed. The pr incipal  design a l t e rna t i ve s  
considered here -- tradable,  grandfathered emissions permits or 
auctions of permits of a f ixed l i f e  -- a re  s t i l l  wel l  wi thin  t he  
control of the s t a t e ,  a s  a r e  the control led t rading options of EPA. 
What i s  required i s  t h a t  permits be defined care fu l ly  enough t o  avoid 
conveying a diminution of the public's control  of a i r  resources. 
We have undertaken extensive ana lys i s  of the  cost  impact of 
t radable  emissions permits on industry.  Before summarizing it, a 
general  point should be made: imposing roughly s imi la r  cos t s  on a l l  
business i n  a region simultaneously i s  f a r  l e s s  damaging t o  l oca l  
industry than regulat ing each firm on a case-by-case bas i s ,  with cost  
increases  taking place sequent ia l ly  over many years. The reason i s  
t h a t  the  former does not damage one firm i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  i t s  
competitors. Simultaneous cost  increases  t o  a l l  businesses w i l l  cause 
some reduction i n  s a l e s  and p r o f i t s ,  but nothing l i k e  the  e f f ec t  i f  
one f i rm experiences a cost  increase while i t s  competitors do not.  
One source of intense res i s tance  of regulated businesses t o  
environmental regulat ion i s  the th rea t  i n  a case-by-case regulatory 
approach t h a t  your firm w i l l  come out t r e a t ed  more harshly than the  
competition. 
Another general  point i s  t h a t  the  t radable  emissions permits 
system causes a l l  f irms t o  experience s imilar  cost  increases,  a s  wel l  
a s  simultaneous cost  increases.  This i s  because of the consequence of 
trading i n  the  market: f i rms with r e l a t i v e l y  high cos t s  of add i t iona l  
abatement can avoid them by buying permits from firms with r e l a t i ve ly  
low marginal abatement costs ,  the net  e f f ec t  being grea te r  abatement 
by firms with lower costs .  Hence a t radable  emissions permit system 
f o r  any given stringency of control  over t o t a l  emissions w i l l  have a 
more even f i nanc i a l  impact across f i nns  and indus t r ies  than a 
standard- sett ing approach. 
The pr incipal  e f f ec t  of a r e l a t i ve ly  pure t radable  permits 
system i s  t ha t  permits t o  e m i t  become a valuable intangible  a s se t  t o  
t h e i r  owners, thereby a f fec t ing  t he  d i s t r i bu t i on  of wealth i n  society .  
Our market simulations f i n d  t h a t  a permit t o  emit one ton  of s u l f u r  
oxides per day for  a year i n  Los Angeles would be worth between 
$400,000 and $1.5 mil l ion,  depending on the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of na tura l  
gas, i f  the  S t a t e  AAQS i s  t o  be s a t i s f i ed .  I f  the  150 tons per day 
were auctioned, the  revenues per  year from the s a l e  would amount t o  
between $60 mi l l ion  and $225 mi l l ion  do l l a r s ,  respectively.  Moreover, 
a s  the  economy grows, these numbers can only be expected t o  r i s e .  
These numbers a r e  comparable i n  magnitude t o  t o t a l  abatement 
cos t s  f o r  the same cases. Sat isfying S t a t e  AAQS w i l l  cost  between 
$100 mi l l ion  and $600 mi l l ion  do l l a r s  per year i n  addi t ional  abatement 
costs ,  over pre-1977 standards, again depending on the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
na tura l  gas. Thus, i f  f irms ac tua l ly  have t o  pay for  emissions 
permits through a state- run auction, the  e f f e c t  w i l l  be t o  increase 
the  costs  of a i r  po l lu t ion  regula t ion  t o  the  f i rm by a subs tan t ia l  
amount. By contras t ,  the  immediate cost  savings from sh i f t i ng  from 
the current system t o  a system of t radable  emissions permits a r e  a 
reduction of on the order of $20 mi l l ion  per year i n  abatement cos t s ,  
p lus  whatever cos t s  can be saved by a more streamlined regulatory 
process, by f a c i l i t a t i n g  entry,  e x i t  and expansion of sources, and by 
providing an addi t ional  incent ive fo r  businesses t o  f ind  new 
technologies t o  lower t h e i r  abatement costs .  I n  any case, the  
reduction i n  abatement costs ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  the  short  run, i s  l i ke ly  t o  
be more than o f f s e t  f o r  most firms by purchases of permits i f  a s ta te -  
run auct ion i s  used. This s t r i k e s  us a s  of po ten t ia l ly  g rea t  
p o l i t i c a l  importance, f o r  i t  i s  l i ke ly  t o  be the  case that business 
w i l l  s trongly oppose the system because the new "tax" (e.g. permits 
s a l e s )  w i l l  more than o f f s e t  the cost savings. 
Grandfathering ex is t ing  emissions, or some f r ac t i on  of them, 
a s  a means t o  i n i t i a l i z e  the system does not face t h i s  problem. Here 
the valuable permits a r e  given away. Trades take place only i f  both 
s ides  can reduce t he i r  t o t a l  cos t s  by trading. The a c t  of trading 
permits i s ,  i n  essence, the  ac t  of the  buyer abating t he  se l le r ' s  
pol lut ion r a the r  than h i s lhe r  own because i t  i s  cheaper t o  do so. 
The industry s tud ies  we have examined have addressed t he  
question of the  a b i l i t y  of these i ndus t r i e s  t o  withstand higher 
abatement cos t s  without leaving t he  region. Each of the  industry 
s tud ies  compares the cost  of compliance i n  the competitive a l loca t ion  
of permits with the  t o t a l  cost  s t r uc tu r e  of t he  firms, and asks 
whether the  cos t  increase required is  grea te r  than the cos t s  of 
re locat ing elsewhere and t ransport ing the  goods t o  t h i s  region from 
another l oca l i t y .  The general  f inding i s  negative. The major 
po l lu t ion  sources i n  Los Angeles have a subs tan t ia l  margin of cost  
increases  t ha t  they could absorb before being driven from the area.  
This i s  not t o  say tha t  these cos t s  a r e  unimportant or  t r i v a l ;  indeed, 
businesses would experience a decl ine i n  t h e i r  net  value t o  
stockholders from a major cost  increase due t o  more s t r ingent  
environmental standards. It i s  the narrow question of plant closings 
and re loca t ions  t h a t  we have examined, and these would not appear t o  
be a major issue,  especial ly  i f  the process of s e l l i ng  permits caused 
funds t o  be real located among businesses, ra ther  than col lected by the 
s t a t e .  
Recognition of the subs t an t i a l  value of these permits caused 
us t o  tu rn  our a t t en t i on  t o  developing a market t h a t  combined t he  
a t t r i b u t e s  of a per iodic  auct ion of permits with f ixed durat ion with 
the property of grandfathering -- e.g. allowing t he  a s se t  value of the  
permits t o  remain with business, r a the r  than accrue t o  the s t a t e  
through the auction. The i n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  we have developed i s  t h e  
"Zero Revenue Auction." It proceeds a s  follows. Each ex is t ing  source 
i s  a l located an i n i t i a l  holding of permits equal t o  some f r ac t i on  of 
i t s  holdings i n  the expiring permits (e.g. the ex is t ing  source- 
spec i f ic  standards).  The exact value of t h i s  f r a c t i o n  depends on t he  
decision of the  regulator  about the new t a rge t  l eve l  of t o t a l  
emissions. These i n i t i a l  a l loca t ions  e s t ab l i sh  the wealth posi t ions  
of business, but not t h e i r  ent i t lements  t o  the permits themselves. 
Each firm i s  then required t o  report  i t s  wil l ingness  t o  pay fo r  
various quan t i t i e s  of permits. It can repor t  these demands with any 
complexity it  wants, but a standard approach would be t o  report  a 
s e r i e s  of d i s c r e t e  a l t e rna t i ve s :  f o r  example, a will ingness t o  pay $5 
mi l l ion  t o  emit one ton per day, $8 mi l l ion  t o  emit two tons per day, 
and $10 mi l l ion  t o  emit three tons per day or  any grea te r  amount. 
These reports  would cons t i tu te  the  "bids" i n  the  auct ion f o r  permits. 
The s t a t e  would then ca lcu la te  the pr ice  tha t  causes the number of 
permits demanded t o  be exactly equal t o  the  number of permits t he  
regulator  i s  wi l l ing  t o  allow. Permits would then be d i s t r i bu t ed  t o  
the firms according t o  t he  number they were wi l l ing  t o  buy a t  t h a t  
price.  Each f i rm would then make a net payment t o  the  regulator  of 
t h i s  auct ion pr ice  times the  dif ference between t he  f i n a l  a l l oca t i on  
and the  i n i t i a l ,  grandfathered al locat ion.  Thus, i f  the  f i rm i n  the 
preceding example had an i n i t i a l  a l l oca t i on  of one ton per day and i f  
the  f i n a l  auction pr ice  were $4 mi l l ion  per ton per day, the  f i rm 
would receive new permits f o r  two tons per day and would make a net  
payment of $4 mil l ion,  However, i f  a l l  o ther  conditions were the same 
but the  firm's i n i t i a l  a l l oca t i on  were permits f o r  three tons per day, 
then the f i rm would s t i l l  get permits f o r  two tons per day from the 
auct ion -- and would, i n  addi t ion,  receive four mi l l ion  do l la r s .  
This i n s t i t u t i o n  has very a t t r a c t i v e  proper t ies .  The net  
revenue co l lec t ion  by the s t a t e  from the auct ion i s  zero -- the  
auct ion serves only t o  r e d i s t r i b u t e  revenues among f i rms,  with firms 
increasing t h e i r  emissions paying firms who a r e  decreasing t he i r s .  
That i s ,  the po l lu te rs  pay the aba te rs  t o  abate. Nevertheless, the  
problems of grandfathered permits -- in termit tent  and infrequent 
t rades  and the pos s ib i l i t y  of monopsony -- a r e  avoided by the second, 
auct ion stage. 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 
Perhaps the  most d i f f i c u l t  problems t o  overcome i n  s e t t i n g  up 
a tradable pennits market i s  t ha t  i t  f l i e s  i n  the face  of regulatory 
law -- both environmental and publ ic  u t i l i t y .  The Clean A i r  Act and 
amendments a r e  the  f i r s t  hurdle. They s e t  up the source- specific 
standards process, and give t o  the  federa l  government the  
r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  "technology forcing" new source performance 
standards. The idea i s  t o  requ i re  new sources always t o  use up-to- 
date  abatement technologies, even i f  the  cost  per un i t  of abated 
po l lu t ion  i s  higher than f o r  o l d  sources. Whereas the  federa l  
government has been r e l a t i v e l y  l en i en t  i n  l e t t i n g  s t a t e s  allow t rades  
of emissions from old sources, it has not y e t  shown a wi l l ingness  t o  
be f l e x i b l e  wi th  respect  t o  new source performance standards.  
A r e l a t i v e l y  pure t radab le  emissions permits market can be 
es tab l i shed  within  the  l i m i t s  of the  new source performance standards.  
Old sources can s t i l l  make mutually benef ic ia l  t rades ,  and new sources 
w i l l  s t i l l  have t o  acquire permits through the  market f o r  any 
emissions t h a t  they produce while i n  compliance with NSPS. But a 
major po t en t i a l  advantage of the permits system i s  t h a t  it could make 
entry  of new sources e a s i e r  s t i l l  by ignoring NSPS and re ta in ing  
regulatory focus so le ly  on t o t a l  basin-wide emissions. 
The second major l ega l  problem has t o  do with public u t i l i t y  
regulat ion.  Regulation of the p r ices  and p r o f i t s  of u t i l i t i e s  i s  
designed t o  prevent monopoly p r o f i t s  from accruing t o  u t i l i t i e s  a s  a 
consequence of t h e i r  franchised se rv ice  monopolies. Thus e laborate  
accounting procedures have been s e t  up t o  prevent u t i l i t i e s  from 
recovering anything from ratepayers  beyond the  t r ue  economic cost  of 
doing business. Intangible  a s s e t s  a r e  an espec ia l ly  suspicious item 
t o  u t i l i t y  regu la to rs ,  because they a r e  a means of padding the  r a t e  
base t o  earn higher prof i t s .  
Unfortunately, t radable  permits a r e  an in tang ib le  a s s e t .  
Moreover, a grandfathering approach would e s t ab l i sh  the  value of 
permits f o r  ratemaking purposes equal t o  t h e i r  acqu is i t ion  cost  -- 
namely, nothing. And, i f  a u t i l i t y  sold  a permit f o r  more than i t s  
book value (nothing),  the  e n t i r e  revenue from the  s a l e  would have t o  
be passed through t o  ra tepayers  i n  p r ice  cuts .  This obviously 
undermines t h e  incent ives  of utilities t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  permits 
markets. 
After  studying the  precedents, accounting techniques and a s s e t  
categor ies  of u t i l i t y  regulat ion,  we have discovered a number of 
promising p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  One i s  t r e a t i n g  permits a s  l eases ,  and 
making use of the  mandate f o r  innovative regulatory techniques t o  
account f o r  broader soc ia l  po l i c i e s  t h a t  was es tab l i shed  i n  t he  Public 
U t i l i t i e s  Regulatory Po l i c i e s  Act. These a r e  discussed i n  d e t a i l  i n  
our main repor t ,  a s  a r e  the  changes i n  environmental l e g i s l a t i o n  
needed t o  implement a full- fledged t radable  permits system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We bel ieve t h a t  a t radab le  emissions permit market f o r  su l fu r  
oxides emissions i n  Los Angeles i s  f ea s ib l e .  Three general  approaches 
a r e  possible:  a grandfathered system i n  which the  regu la to rs  
pass ively  permit t rades;  an auct ion i n  which the  s t a t e  keeps the  
revenues; and the  zero-revenue auction based on grandfathered i n i t i a l  
a l loca t ions  of the  a s se t  values of the  permits. Grandfathered systems 
have the p o l i t i c a l  advantage of causing the cost-savings of the switch 
t o  a t radable  permits system t o  be kept by industry,  and by avoiding 
the debate about taxes  tha t  would inevi tably accompany the s t r a igh t  
auction. Yet auctions a r e  more e f f i c i en t .  Consequently, we would 
recommend tha t  the zero-revenue auction be t r i ed .  We have designed a 
small-group experiment t o  explore the  proper t ies  of t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n .  
Our preliminary experiments are  promising. They ind ica te  t ha t  our 
expectations t h a t  it achieves an e f f i c i e n t  r e s u l t  a r e  correct .  
With respect  t o  the other design i s sues ,  we see no reason t o  
do anything more complicated than have a homogeneous, areawide 
emissions permit, r a the r  than t o  "f ine tune1' the system with a s e r i e s  
of geographically specif ied submarkets. To f a c i l i t a t e  adjustment of 
the  ce i l i ng  on emissions and the entry  of new sources i n t o  the  basin ,  
we bel ieve t h a t  the  permits should be of f ixed duration. An 
i l l u s t r a t i v e  approach would be t o  ass ign a l i f e  of nine years t o  
permits, and have one-third expire  every three years. Thus, 
r e l a t i ve ly  frequent auctions could be held t o  ad jus t  the number of 
permits, f a c i l i t a t e  entry  of new sources, and r ea l l oca t e  emissions; 
but the durat ion of the permits would be long enough t o  provide 
s t a b i l i t y  t o  t h e i r  holders,  and a r a t i ona l  decision about long-term 
investments i n  abatement equipment. 
The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  study a r e  appl icable  t o  other  regions 
having s imilar  conditions. The key fea tures  of an environmental 
problem t h a t  make i t  a t t r a c t i v e  fo r  an experiment i n  marketing 
emissions r i g h t s  are: 
(1) the  problem i s  l i ke ly  t o  be solvable a t  reasonable costs ,  
( 2 )  a su f f i c i en t l y  l a rge  number of sources contr ibute  s i gn i f i c an t l y  
t o  the problem so t h a t  a competitive market can be es tabl ished,  
( 3 )  emissions a r e  or can be e f f ec t i ve ly  monitored a t  reasonable cos t ,  
and 
(4) t he  ex is t ing  s i t ua t i on ,  owing t o  costs  of compliance and 
environmental degradation, i s  widely recognized a s  undesirable. 
The Zero Revenue Auction needs very l i t t l e  e l s e  i n  t h e  way of 
informational requirements. When combined with upper bound 
cons t ra in t s  on emissions a t  any s ing le  source t o  guard against  
local ized po l lu t ion  hot spots ,  it guarantees t h a t  improvements i n  
compliance cos t s  w i l l  be made without environmental degradation -- or  
no s ign i f i c an t  trading (and hence no problems) w i l l  emerge. When 
combined with reduced t o t a l  emissions, it can a l so  guarantee 
improvements i n  a i r  qua l i t y  i n  the  region. 
